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Abstract. Analyses of the welfare system generally examine one of five competing models: (1) The 
work disincentive model; (2) the human capital model; (3) the macroeconomic model; (4) the pub- 
lic choice model; or (5) the cost-of-job-loss model. This paper employs the Granger causality con- 
cept and the multiple-rank F statistic to test the implications of all five of these models simultane- 
ously. The results offer modest support to all but the macroeconomic model. The relationships 
among welfare benefits, caseloads, and labor market conditions appear to be too complex to be 
fully captured by a single model. 
1. Introduct ion 
Since the inception of  public assistance programs, critics have argued that 
offering benefits, however well-intended, would reward and thus create 
poverty. For example, after visiting England and reviewing its Poor  Laws, Ben- 
jamin Franklin (1776) commented, " In  short, you offered a premium for the 
encouragement of  idleness, and you should not now wonder that it has had its 
effect in the increase in pover ty ."  
Many social scientists have investigated this work disincentive hypothesis. 
For example, Moffit t  (! 987) analyzes cross-sectional data and finds that higher 
AFDC guarantee levels are associated with a greater likelihood of  welfare par- 
ticipation. Duncan (1984) analyzes panel data and finds that most welfare 
recipients receive benefits for only a short period of  time and typically join the 
welfare rolls following a change in family composition (e.g., divorce or birth 
of  a child). Murray (1984) presents time series plots which show that the 
number o f  mother-only families and the welfare caseload have both increased 
since the War  on Poverty began, suggesting that the expansion of  welfare creat- 
ed more poverty. 
Examination of  all types of  data on welfare variables is important;  however, 
visual comparison of  time series plots hardly constitutes rigorous analysis. 
More sophisticated time series techniques are available; for example, macro- 
economists have used testable causality concepts quite fruitfully in the study 
of  money, income, and prices (e.g., Sims 1972, Holmes and Hut ton,  1992). 
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Welfare analysts generally rely on cross-sectional or panel data and thus rarely 
employ such time series techniques.1 This omission creates a gap in the analy- 
sis of  the effects of  welfare benefits - a useful analytical tool has been over- 
looked. Causality tests could improve our understanding of  the relationship 
between welfare benefits, caseloads, and labor market conditions over time. 
While these tests are not perfect and new techniques are still evolving, they do 
provide the best available evidence on causality when controlled experiments 
are not possible. 
Granger causality tests determine whether past values of  a variable X signifi- 
cantly improve the forecast of  the current value of  another variable Y. If  infor- 
mation on past X is a statistically significant predictor of  current Y then X 
"Granger-causes" Y. That  is, the Granger test identifies a variable X as causal 
if changes in X both precede and are significant predictors of  changes in 
another variable Y. Philosophically this is a limited concept of  causality; it is, 
however, a testable concept. 
A basic technical criticism of  Granger causality tests is that the standard F- 
test of  joint significance, upon which the test relies, can be misleading in the 
presence of  nonlinearities and heteroscedastic errors. Consequently we employ 
an alternative test statistic, the multiple-rank F statistic, as suggested by 
Holmes and Hut ton (1992). This non-parametric test statistic results f rom stan- 
dard regression analysis of  ranked, rather than raw, data. Monte Carlo studies 
show that this test statistic is less sensitive to error distribution and nonlineari- 
ties. The present analysis uses this test statistic and the Granger-causality con- 
cept to test formally for causal patterns among AFDC benefits, the AFDC 
caseload, the unemployment rate, and average earnings in Michigan. The focus 
on one state avoids the aggregation bias inherent in analysis of  national 
averages. Of particular interest is whether AFDC benefits cause, in the Granger 
sense, the AFDC caseload. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the work disincentive 
model as well as four competing models of  the welfare caseload. Each model 's 
predicted patterns of  causality are identified. For example, if the work disin- 
centive hypothesis is correct we would observe that benefits cause the caseload. 
Section 2 describes the methodology and the data. Section 3 reports the results 
of  the causality tests. Section 4 presents a summary and conclusions. 
2. Models of  the welfare caseload 
Prior studies typically examine one of  five competing models of  the welfare 
caseload: (1) The work disincentive model; (2) the human capital model; (3) the 
macroeconomic model; (4) the public choice model; and (5) the cost-of-job- 
loss model. First, the work disincentive hypothesis derives f rom a simple 
93 
model of individual choice. An individual chooses between work, which 
generates earned income and decreases leisure time, and nonwork, which 
can generate unearned (welfare) income and increases leisure time. The in- 
dividual will choose the state, work or welfare, which yields the highest ex- 
pected utility. We can represent the individual's choice with the dichotomous 
variable WELFARE: 
I 
0 if U(EARN, LEISURE, Ee) > U(BEN, LEISURE, Ew) 
WELFARE = (1) 
1 if U(EARN, LEISURE, Ee) < U(BEN, LEISURE, Ew) 
where EARN is real earnings, BEN is the real welfare benefit, and the 
E's represent unobservable random values or tastes regarding work and 
welfare. The work disincentive hypothesis focuses on the implication that, 
ceteris paribus, the higher are welfare benefits, the higher is the utility from 
welfare and thus the more likely the individual is to choose nonwork and 
welfare receipt. Increases in welfare benefits will consequently cause increases 
in the welfare caseload and perhaps increases in the unemployment rate. 
Analyses of the two components of the AFDC benefit formula, the guaran- 
tee and the implicit tax rate (or benefit reduction rate), also predict that higher 
benefits will lead to increases in the caseload and reductions in labor supply. 
Danziger et aL (1981) survey the literature on the labor supply effects of wel- 
fare and conclude that welfare benefits cause a small decrease in labor supply. 
The authors note that reductions in the implicit tax rate raise the breakeven 
level of income, making more people eligible for benefits. Thus, reducing this 
tax rate will raise benefits and increase the caseload via a purely mechanical 
response. Thus, a finding that benefits Granger-cause the caseload is consistent 
with both the work disincentive model and this mechanical response. 
Second, the human capital model notes that the model of individual choice 
(1) also implies that increases in earnings wilt increase the utility from work and 
will thus lower the likelihood that the individual wilt choose nonwork and wel- 
fare receipt, ceterisparibus. This model predicts that higher earnings will cause 
the welfare caseload to fall. Thus, causality flows from earnings to the 
caseload. There is some cross-sectional evidence in support of this model. 
Moffitt (1983), using 1975 data, finds that the wage rate and the AFDC partici- 
pation rate are negatively related. 
The individual choice analysis yields two different implications which sug- 
gest radically different policies. The work disincentive implication suggests 
that reducing welfare benefits will reduce caseloads and increase labor force 
participation and employment. The human capital implication suggests that in- 
stead of reducing welfare benefits, education and training programs designed 
to increase earnings will cause decreases in unemployment and the caseload. 
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The third model, the macroeconomic model, emphasizes the role of trends 
in unemployment on the welfare caseload. Unemployment, and the ensuing 
poverty, may not be a matter of personal choice; individuals may be involun- 
tarily unemployed or may withdraw from the labor force as a result of adverse 
regional or national macroeconomic trends. For example, Moffitt (1983) finds 
that the probability of welfare participation rises as the unemployment rate in- 
creases. Bassi (1990) reports that the increase in women's welfare receipt during 
the 1970's resulted in part from an increase in their involuntary unemploy- 
ment. 2 In this view, unemployment causes welfare caseloads. Macroeconomic 
policies designed to stimulate job growth could reduce welfare caseloads. 
The models thus far ignore the fact that both the level of benefits and eligibil- 
ity criteria result from collective choices at the federal and state levels of 
government. Public choice theory predicts that significant increases in the 
number of poor and welfare dependent could lead to increases in welfare 
benefits. A significant increase in the number of poor relative to the number 
of nonpoor could alter the distribution of voters as identified by income. 3 The 
resulting distribution would have a lower income median voter. A poorer 
median voter may have a greater incentive to vote for higher welfare benefits. 
Thus, the caseload could cause the benefit level. 
There has been some concern about the claim that increases in the welfare 
caseload could increase the power of recipients as a voting bloc. Voter turnout 
among the poor has historically been low, and, as Olson (1971) explains, the 
larger and more diverse the group, the more difficult it is to form an effective 
lobby. It seems unlikely then that recipient could use their political power to 
gain increases in welfare benefits. 
Leffler (1978) suggests that welfare bureaucracies and labor unions, rather 
than the poor themselves, tend to form pro-welfare lobbies. A greater welfare 
caseload generally implies a more sophisticated welfare bureaucracy, whose 
members may lobby for its expansion. Labor unions may also support more 
generous welfare benefits in order to reduce competition for union jobs. 
Anderson (1987) finds that the level of AFDC payments is highly and positively 
correlated with the political power held by organized labor. The more poor, 
the greater the threat to union jobs, and the more likely is organized labor to 
lobby for generous welfare benefits and eligibility criteria. The greater the wel- 
fare caseload, the stronger will be union lobbying efforts to increase welfare 
benefits. Again, public choice theory predicts that caseloads cause the benefit 
level. 
The fifth and final model derives from Bowles (1985) and Schor and Bowles 
(1987), which argue that the unemployment rate affects the negotiating power 
of workers relative to employers. Schor and Bowles (1987) suggest that high 
unemployment strengthens employers' negotiating power and ability to extract 
labor from workers. If workers must risk long periods of unemployment they 
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are less likely to shirk, demand higher wages, or strike. Thus, high unemploy- 
ment will exert downward pressure on wages and earnings. Conversely, when 
unemployment is low workers risk only short term unemployment and are sub- 
sequently more likely to shirk, demand higher wages, or strike. In short~ the 
cost of losing one's job is inversely related to worker demands. If true, we 
would expect to find that the unemployment rate causes earnings. 
More generous welfare benefits reduce the cost of job loss and thus increase 
workers' negotiating power. The cost-of-job-loss model thus also predicts that 
increases in the welfare benefit level will cause wages and earnings to increase. 
In addition, expansion of welfare will countervail the depressing effects of un- 
employment on wages. In short, this model predicts that welfare benefits cause 
earnings and that benefits may lessen the effect of unemployment on earnings. 
The five models predict very different causal patterns among welfare 
benefits, caseloads, earnings and the unemployment rate. Table 1 summarizes 
the causal patterns for each model. The task at hand is to determine which, if 
any, of these patterns are consistent with the data. 
3. Methodology and data 
Many earlier studies of the welfare caseload focus on one of the five models 
presented and test only whether or not that model's implications are empirical- 
ly supported. Consequently the possibility that more than one model contrib- 
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utes to the understanding of the caseload is precluded. The Granger causality 
test reqtfires only a very general autoregressive model structure which allows 
us to test the implications of all five models simultaneously. 
Most prior research on the welfare caseload uses cross-sectional or panel 
data. Cross-sectional data cannot reveal the true dynamic nature of the 
caseload generation process. Panel data can capture the dynamic process, 
however the number of observations (time periods) available in most panel 
data sets is fairly limited. Murray (1984) and Moffitt (1987) both use annual 
data to analyze caseloads and welfare participation, but both rely on simple 
visual inspection of trends. Moffitt admits that such techniques are "extremely 
crude, and it would be desirable to conduct a more formal statistical examina- 
t i o n . . . "  The Granger causality test provides the technique for such formal 
statistical analysis. 
This section reviews the Granger causality concept and the associated time 
series techniques for testing such causality. We begin with a simple bivariate 
example and then expand the analysis to our multivariate system. 
Granger (1969) proposes that X t "causes" Yt if information on past and 
present X t significantly improves the forecast of Yt .4 Formally, let a sta- 
tionary, normally distributed bivariate autoregressive process of order p 
generate X t and Yt: 
X t = a l l  ( L ) X  t + a12 ( L ) Y t  + Elt 
Yt = a21 (L) X t + a22 (L) Yt + E2t 
(2) 
where L denotes the lag operator (L = I . . . .  p). Assuming past and present 
X t and Yt represent all relevant information, X t Granger-causes Yt if the 
~21(L) differ significantly from zero. If both the ,~21(L) and fi12(L) are nonzero, 
there is feedback between the two variables: X t and Yt simultaneously cause 
each other. Note that this only tests the ability of past and current X t to 
predict current Yt, which, in a strict philosophical sense, differs from the no- 
tion that X t causes Yr For the sake of exposition however, we use the term 
"causes" to denote that a variable "Granger-causes" another throughout the 
remainder of the paper. 
To conduct Granger causality tests of the hypothesized patterns identified 
in Section 1 we estimate systems of the following general form: 
B E N  t = all(L)BENt + a12(L)CASEt + aI3(L)UNEMt + a14(L)EARNt +elt  
CASE t = a21(L)CASEt+a22(L)BENt+a23(L)UNEMt+a2a(L)EARNt+e2t 
U N E M  t = a31(L)UNEMt+a32(L)CASEt +a33(L)BENt +a3~(L)EARNt +e3t 




L = the lag operator 
BEN = the real AFDC benefit 
CASE = the AFDC caseload 
UNEM = the unemployment rate 
EARN = the real weekly earnings 
If  benefits cause the caseload, as predicted by the work disincentive model, the 
~2  will be jointly significantly different f rom zero. If, on the other hand, the 
unemployment rate alone drives the caseload the ~22 will not differ f rom zero, 
but  the ~23 will. 
The data are monthly observations of  Michigan averages beginning with 
January 1970 and ending with August 1992. 5 The focus on one state avoids the 
aggregation bias inherent in analysis of  national averages. We employ two 
measures of  the AFDC caseload: the number of  cases (CASE) and the number 
of  individuals receiving AFDC benefits (RECIP). Benefits (BEN) are accord- 
ingly measured as either the real AFDC benefit per case (CBEN) or per in- 
dividual recipient (RBEN). 6 Food Stamps are generally considered to be near- 
money and data on the average value of  Food Stamps per recipient is availa- 
ble. 7 Thus we also use the combined AFDC and Food Stamps benefit per 
recipient (TBEN) as a measure of  welfare benefits. 8 We measure earnings 
(EARN) as the weekly average real earnings of  Michigan manufacturing 
workers. The appendix describes these data and lists the sources. 
Causality tests require that each time series, or variable, be stationary. A 
time series can be made stationary either by including a time variable or by 
differencing the data, depending on the structure of  the series. Nelson and 
Kang (1984) detail the problems of  "spurious t rend"  and of  detrending by in- 
clusion of  a time variable when the difference procedure is required. Following 
Nelson and Plosser (1982), we determine whether each variable is a trend- 
stationary process (TSP) or a difference-stationary process (DSP) by esti- 
mating the equation: 
Yt = a + bY t_ l  + cT + e t (4) 
where Yt is the variable in natural logs and T is a time trend variable. If  b = 1 
and c = 0, then the variable is a difference-stationary process (DSP class) and 
can be made stationary by differencing. If  b < 1, then the variable follows a 
time-stationary process (TSP class) and can be made stationary by including 
a time variable. We use the Dickey and Fuller (1981) likelihood ratio to test the 
hypothesis b = 1 and c = 0 against the hypothesis that b < 1. All variables in 
this analysis belong to the TSP class. To induce stationarity we simply include 
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a time trend variable (T) in all regressions. A constant term is also included to 
assure that the stationary series have zero means. 
Holmes and Hutton (1988) show that if Y is a function of X, any strictly 
monotonic transformation of Y and/or X (e.g., ranking) will not destroy 
the functional relationship. Regression on ranked variables will generate a 
multiple-rank F test rather than a standard parametric F test. Conover and 
Iman (1982) and Olejnik and Algina (1985) conduct Monte Carlo studies of the 
multiple-rank F test and find that in small samples this non-parametric test is 
robust in the presence of non-normal errors. Also, the power of this test over 
the parametric F statistic improved in cases where the error structure was non- 
normal and heteroscedastic. 
Each variable and its lags are treated as separate variables when transform- 
ing the data into ranks. Consequently 96 new variables must be created - the 
first through twenty-fourth lags of each of the original four variables: BEN, 
CASE, UNEM, and EARN. The four original variables and all of the lagged 
variables are then transformed into their ranks (the mean rank is assigned in 
the case of ties). Equation (3) will then be estimated using the variables in ranks 
and will thus generate a multiple-rank F test statistic. The analysis will use this 
statistic to test for the joint significance of a variable's set of lags, i.e. to test 
for Granger causality. 
Before the system described by equation (3) can be estimated the appropriate 
lag lengths for each ranked variable must be determined. For each variable (in 
ranks) we estimate a series of autoregressive processes, with lag length varying 
from one to twenty-four. There are various criteria available to determine 
which of the lag lengths is optimal and frequently different criteria indicate 
different lag lengths (Geweke and Meese, 1981 and Thorton and Batten, 1985). 
We consider three criteria: Akaike's criterion (AIC); Amemiya's final predic- 
tion error (FPE); and the Schwarz criterion (SC). In all but one case the FPE 
and AIC select the same lag length. The SC indicates the shortest lag length in 
all cases. Because the Schwarz criteria tends to underestimate the true lag ord- 
er, we choose the lag indicated by the FPE and AIC (Choi, 1992). In the one 
case where the FPE and AIC criteria indicate different lag orders we choose 
the order indicated by the FPE as this criterion will also be used in determining 
causal ordering in the multivariate model. 9 
Once the appropriate own-lag lengths are determined we estimate bivariate 
regressions of a variable on its own lags and on lags of one of the model's other 
variables. Following the specific gravity criterion of Caines, Keng, and Sethi 
(1981), the variable with the minimum FPE among the all the autoregressive 
equations is added first. An equation of the variable on its own-lags and on 
the lags of the added variable is then estimated, letting the order of the latter 
lag vary from one to twenty-four. The FPE and AIC again indicate the ap- 
propriate lag for the second variable. The third and fourth variables are added 
and their lag orders are similarly determined. 
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After selecting the appropriate variable ordering and lag lengths we pool the 
four equations (BEN, CASE, UNEM, and EARN) to form a system, which is 
re-estimated by the maximum likelihood procedure. This procedure accounts 
for  possible cross-equation error correlation. F-tests of  the joint significance 
of  the coefficients on each variable's set of  lags are then performed to infer 
whether or not a given variable causes the dependent variable. Three systems 
are estimated, each using one of  the three different measures of  the benefit 
(AFDC benefit per case, AFDC benefit per recipient, and combined AFDC 
and Food Stamps benefits per recipient): 
C B E N  t = 
C A S E  t = 
U N E M  t = 
E A R N  t = 
a o + a l l ( 1 3 ) C B E N t  + a l 2 ( 4 ) C A S E  t + a I 3 ( 1 ) U N E M  t + a14 (1 )EARN t + b i T  + e l t  
a o + a21(14)CASEt  + az2(2)CBEN t + a23(3 )UNEM t + a24 (8 )EARN t + b2T + e2t 
a o + a 31(15)UNEM t + a32(1)CASE t + a33(1)CBEN t + a a a ( 3 ) E A R N  t + b3T + e3t 
a o + a41(14)EARNt  + a42(5)CASE t + aga (1 )CBEN t + a44 (9 )UNEM t + b4T + e4t 
(5) 
R B E N  t = 
R E C I P  t = 
U N E M  t = 
E A R N  t = 
a o + a11(14)RBEN t + a l 2 ( 1 ) R E C I P  t + a13 (2 )UNEM t + a14 (1 )EARN t + b i T  + el t  
a o + a21 (14 )RE CIP  t + a22(13)RBEN t + a23(1 )UNEM t + a24(2)EARNt  + b2T + e2 t 
a o + a31 (15 )UNEM t + a a 2 ( 1 ) R E C I P  t + a33(5)RBEN t + a a 4 ( 3 ) E A R N  t + b3T + e3t 
a o + a41(14)EARNt  + a42 (1 )RECIP  t + a43(1)RBEN t + a44(4 )UNEM t + b4T + eat 
(6) 
T B E N  t = 
R E C I P  t = 
U N E M  t = 
E A R N  t = 
a o + a 11(13)TBENt + a12(1 )RECIP  t + a13 (1 )UNEM t + a14 (4 )EARN t + b i T  + e l t  
a o + a21 (14 )RECIP  t + a22(6)TBEN t + a23(4 )UNEM t + a24 (2 )EARN t + b2T + e2t 
a o + a 3 l ( 1 5 ) U N E M  t + a32(1 )RECIP  t + aa3(1)TBEN t + a34 (3 )EARN t + b3T + eat 
a o + a41(14)EARNt  + a42(1 )RECIP  t + a43(17)TBEN t + a44 (3 )UNEM t + b4T + e4t 
(7) 
where UNEM and EARN are as previously defined and: 
CBEN = real AFDC benefit per case 
RBEN = real AFDC benefit per recipient 
TBEN = real combined AFDC and Food Stamp benefit per recipient 
T = time trend variable 
(k) = the optimal number of  lags 
4. Results 
The first estimated system uses the number of  AFDC cases to measure the wel- 
fare caseload (equation 5). Table 2 reports the observed multiple-rank F statis- 
tic for the joint significance of  the coefficients on each variable's set of  lags. 
For example, in the benefit equation the test statistic for the joint significance 
of  CASE(t - 1) through CASE(t - 4) is 3.73. The critical value for the 99% level 
of  significance is 3.38, thus there is evidence that the AFDC caseload causes 
the benefit level. This result is consistent with the public choice model. 
The results indicate three additional causal patterns. First, earnings and the 
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Table 2. Results of causality tests 
AFDC benefits Multiple rank F Causal 
per case statistic patterns 
CBEN CASE UNEM EARN 
dep. 
CBEN - 3.73 a 1.73 0.025 
BEN EARN 
CASE 0.538 - 0.725 3.67 a 1 
UNEM 2.34 3.07 c - 15"61a CASE UNEM 
EARN 1.93 3.28 a 4.61 a - 
AFDC benefits Multiple rank F Causal 
per recipient statistic patterns 
RBEN RECIP UNEM E A R N  
dep. 
RBEN - 1.45 1.85 0.025 
BEN EARN 
RECIP  4.31 a - 1.47 9.71 a ~ 
UNEM 1.57 1.37 - 9"49a RECIP  UNEM 
EARN 2.43 8.65 a 7.77 a - 
AFDC + Food Stamps Multiple rank F Causal  
benefits per recipient statistic patterns 
TBEN RECIP UNEM E A R N  
dep. 
TBEN - 0.0014 0.0283 1.95 
BEN EARN 
RECIP 3.34 a - 1.79 2.18 ~ 
UNEM 0.392 0.2912 - 10'14a RECIP UNEM 
EARN 2.09 a 0.7446 5.67 a - 
a significant at  the 99% level. 
b significant at the 95% level. 
c significant at the 90% level. 
unemployment rate simultaneously cause each other. Causality running from 
the unemployment rate to earnings is consistent with the cost-of-job-loss 
model. The feedback from earnings to unemployment has more to do with 
labor markets than with welfare programs. Second, the caseload and earnings 
also simultaneously cause each other. The human capital model predicts part 
of this pattern as it implies that earnings cause the caseload. The observed feed- 
back from the caseload to earnings may result from a reduced (increased) sup- 
ply of labor when the welfare caseload increases (decreases). It may also result 
because higher caseloads imply more persons with low or no earnings, which 
would lower average earnings. 
Lastly, the results from the first system indicate that the caseload causes the 
unemployment rate (at the 90% level). This could result simply due to the for- 
mula for calculating the unemployment rate. The more adult recipients with 
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young children, and thus exempt from work requirements, the fewer adults 
there will be actively seeking work. The fewer adults seeking employment, the 
lower is the unemployment rate's denominator, ceteris paribus, and thus the 
higher the unemployment rate. Alternatively, it could be that in order to join 
the welfare roles adults, particularly those with older children, claim to be un- 
employed. 
Next, the system using the number of AFDC recipients to measure the 
caseload and benefits per recipient to measure benefits is estimated (equation 
6). As in the previous system, there is evidence that earnings and the caseload 
simultaneously cause each other. This result offers some support for the hu- 
man capital model. Again the unemployment rate and earnings exhibit mutual 
causation, which offers some support for the cost-of-job loss model. 
The'  'per recipient" system differs from the '  'per case" system in two impor- 
tant ways. First, unlike the "per case" system there is no evidence that the 
caseload measured by the number of recipients causes the unemployment rate. 
This difference may result because the number of recipients is less closely tied 
to the number of adults than is the number of AFDC cases (the majority of 
recipients are children). Second, benefits per caseload do not appear to cause 
the number of AFDC cases, but benefits per recipient appear to cause the 
number of recipients. The latter result is consistent with both the work disin- 
centive model and the mechanics of the benefit reduction rate inherent in the 
AFDC program. 
Because most AFDC recipients also receive Food Stamps a third system 
using the combined benefits per recipient to measure benefits is estimated 
(equation 7). 10 As in the two previous systems, there is evidence that earnings 
and the unemployment rate simultaneously cause each other. Similar to the 
"per recipient" system there is evidence that the combined benefits cause the 
number of AFDC recipients. In contrast to the two previous systems, there is 
no evidence of mutual causation between earnings and the number of 
recipients. Instead there is evidence that the combined benefit causes earnings. 
This result is consistent with the cost-of-job-loss model. 
5. Summary and conclusions 
This paper has employed the most up-to-date techniques for testing causality 
with time series data to examine the relationships between welfare benefits, the 
welfare caseload, the unemployment rate, and earnings. These techniques al- 
low us to test the implications of five basic models of the welfare caseload. The 
results offer limited support for four of the five models. 
The primary hypothesis to be tested is whether AFDC benefits cause the 
AFDC caseload. The results offer some support for this hypothesis: Benefits 
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per recipient cause the number of recipients. This result is consistent with both 
the work disincentive model and with the mechanical relationship between 
eligibility limits and the implicit tax on benefits. 
Benefits per case, however, do not cause the number of cases. Instead, the 
number of cases appear to cause benefits per case. We have no definitive expla- 
nation for this difference yet. Perhaps because the caseload is more closely 
linked to the number of adult recipients and thus the number of potential 
voters and earners, the public choice model receives support only when the 
caseload is measured per case. 
Another possible explanation is that the per recipient measure is picking up 
the effect of benefit levels on family size. Welfare critics have expressed con- 
cern that benefits may encourage poor women to have more children, increas- 
ing the number of recipients. This seems highly unlikely, however, because the 
fertility rates for both high-income and low-income women have been declin- 
ing for three decades. Furthermore, Rank (1989) finds that women on welfare 
have a fertility rate lower than that of the general population and their likeli- 
hood of giving birth declines the longer they are on welfare. 
One causal pattern appears in all three systems: Earnings and the unemploy- 
ment rate simultaneously cause each other. Causality flowing from the unem- 
ployment rate to earnings supports the cost-of-job-loss model. Causality flow- 
ing from earnings to the unemployment rate has more to do with labor market 
theory than the welfare caseload. Standard analysis predicts that when wages 
(and thus earnings) rise fewer labor units will be hired. 
Two predicted patterns find no support. None of the systems produce evi- 
dence that the unemployment rate causes the welfare caseload. Thus, the mac- 
roeconomic model receives no direct support from this analysis. 11 There is 
also no evidence that welfare benefits cause the unemployment rate as the work 
disincentive model predicts. 
The two systems which measure welfare benefits solely as AFDC benefits in- 
dicate that the caseload and earnings simultaneously cause each other. That 
causality runs from earnings to the caseload supports the human capital model. 
However, when the combined AFDC and Food Stamps benefit per recipient 
is used to measure welfare benefits earnings and the caseload do not appear to 
be causally related. Instead benefits appear to cause earnings. This latter result 
is consistent with the cost-of-job-loss model. Perhaps the AFDC benefit by it- 
self is hardly adequate to replace lost earnings, but a package of benefits is. 
This "mixed bag" of findings suggests that researchers and policy-makers 
should be cautious in choosing one model of the welfare caseload over another. 
Our results suggest that the relationships among the welfare benefit, caseload, 
and labor market conditions are too complex to be fully captured by any one 
of the basic models. Instead a number of the various models appear to be im- 
portant in the explanation of welfare caseloads. Previous research on welfare 
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p r o g r a m s  h a s  f o c u s e d  p r i m a r i l y  o n  t h e  w o r k  d i s i n c e n t i v e  a n d  h u m a n  c a p i t a l  
m o d e l s .  T h e s e  f i n d i n g s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  p e r h a p s  t h e  c o s t - o f - j o b - l o s s  m o d e l  m e r i t s  
a n  e q u a l  a m o u n t  o f  a t t e n t i o n .  
Notes 
L Darity and Myers (1984) and Smith (1993) are the exceptions, The former paper uses the 
Granger causality test to determine whether welfare benefits cause female-headed families 
among blacks. The latter paper uses the Granger causality concept to test whether AFDC 
benefits (U.S. average) cause the AFDC caseload. Both analyses rely on techniques for lag 
selection which restrict all variables in the system to the same lag length. 
2. The increase in women's welfare participation also resulted from increased eligibility due to 
lower tax rates on benefits, 
3, Researchers often identify the median voter as the voter with the median income. See Inman 
(1978). 
4. For a review of the causality literature see Pierce and Haugh (1977). 
5. National AFDC policy has changed over the sample period. Most importantly, in 1981 the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) made three significant changes: 1. Absolute in- 
come ceilings were instituted, reducing the eligibility of the working poor; 2. The income dis- 
regard was reduced; and 3. Ceilings on work related deductions were set. These changes re- 
moved approximately 400,000 families from the national AFDC rolls. This simultaneous 
reduction of benefits and caseloads could increase the likelihood that benefits will appear to 
Granger-cause caseloads (or the reverse pattern). 
To test whether this policy change caused a shift in the models' parameters a dummy variable 
denoting post-OBRA observations were included in each equation and the systems were then 
re-estimated. In the first system (by case) two of the post-OBRA dummies are statistically sig- 
nificant. Not surprisingly, the post-OBRA dummy in the benefits equation is significant (at 
the 10%0 level) and negative. The dummy in the earnings equation is significant at the 5% level 
and positive. These potential shifts suggest some caution should be taken in interpreting the 
results of this system. 
In the second system (by recipient) only one post-OBRA dummy, in the unemployment 
equation, is significant at the 10% level. In the final system (combined benefits per recipient) 
none of the post-OBRA dummies are statistically significant. In these two systems structural 
shifts do not seem to be a problem. 
6. These are the average monthly benefits in the AFDC-Regular program and do not include 
benefits in the AFDC-Unemployed Parent program. Michigan's maximum AFDC benefit 
tends to exceed the national average slightly both in nominal and real terms. 
7. Studies of welfare commonly use the combined AFDC and Food Stamp benefit to measure 
total cash welfare benefits as Food Stamps are generally considered to be "near cash." Hamer- 
mesh and Johannes (1985) find that Food Stamps substitute one-for-one with M1, although 
the marginal propensity to consume out of Food Stamp coupons exceeds that of ordinary in- 
come. Moffitt (1989) examines the 1982 "cash out"  of the Food Stamps program in Puerto 
Rico and finds that Food Stamps in this jurisdiction were equivalent to cash. 
8. Ideally BEN would be measured by the entire package of cash and in-kind benefits available. 
However, some components of this package, e.g. medical care and other in-kind benefits, are 
very difficult to measure. Due to the difficulty of determining the value of these benefits to 
recipients and the lack of complete series on all benefits we use the dominant cash benefit 
available, AFDC. We use the national CPI-U to convert all nominal values into real terms. 
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9. The detailed results of the tag selection regressions are available from the authors upon 
request. 
10. The Michigan Department of Social Services does not have data on Food Stamp benefits per 
c a s e .  
t 1. One could argue that there is weak, indirect evidence in support of the macroeconomic model. 
In systems (5) and (6) the unemployment rate causes earnings, and earnings in turn cause the 
caseload. 
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Appendix: Data Description 
1. Michigan 's  month ly  average unemployment  rate (unadjusted): Current Population Survey Esti- 
mates for Michigan, Michigan Employment  Security Commission.  
mean  = 9.23 s.d. = 2.75 min  = 4.3 max  = 17.3 
2. Average weekly real earnings of  Michigan manufactur ing  workers: Michigan Hours & Earnings 
Statistics, v. 1, Bureau of  Research and Statistics, Michigan Employment  Security Commission.  
mean  = $482.74 s.d. = $32.62 min = $410.25 max  = $582.73 
3. Average month ly  real benefit in the Michigan AFDC-Regular  program: Monthly Trend Report 
of Key DSS Statistics, Michigan Depar tment  o f  Social Services, Data  Report ing Section. 
Per case: 
mean  = $444.09 s.d. = $85.25 min = $267.97 max  = $588.81 
Per recipient: 
mean  = $144.11 s.d. = $19.25 min = $94.10 max  = $183.76 
4. Real value of  Michigan 's  average month ly  AFDC-Regular  benefit plus Food Stamps benefits 
per recipient: Monthly Trend Report of Key DSS Statistics, Michigan Depar tment  o f  Social 
Services, Data  Reporting Section. 
mean  = $151.33 s.d. = $51.57 min  = $57.40 max  = $240.37 
5. CPI-U,  city average, all items, 1982= 1984 = 100: C.P.L Detailed Report, January  1992, U.S. 
--- Depar tment  of  Labor,  Bureau of  Labor Statistics. 
